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The Politics of 
Abortion: 
Trends in Canadian 
Fertility Policy i 
Federal governments in Canada have always 
refused to pay the political price of a directly 
applied state abortion policy. This has meant 
that by default the doctors, and the hospital 
therapeutic abortion committees controlled by 
them, determined Canadian abortion prac-
tices. These practices largely serve the middle 
and upper classes and political elites. A 
democratic state cannot openly embrace the 
resulting system whereby abortions are as-
suredly available to rich women but essentially 
denied to poor women. Consequently, the 
state's responses to the abortion/fertility issue 
have been ambiguously symbolic rather than 
substantive. Th i s study attempts to explain 
how the state managed to avoid, despite fierce 
public demand and controversy, establishing 
an equitable abortion/fertility po l i cy . 2 
The Pre-1969 Era 
There is a widespread assumption, nurtured 
by government and the mass media, that in 
1969 national abortion policy was reformed. In 
fact, the state has always maintained indirect 
control of abortion practices by keeping them 
illegal except under very limited c i rcum-
stances. Before 1969, the government simply 
refused to enforce the C r i m i n a l Code's ab-
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solute ban on abortion against hospital-based 
doctors who maintained the polite fiction that 
they only performed abortions required on 
medical grounds. The state's stance had 
moved slowly over the decades from fatalistic 
unconcern to the benevolent paternalism of 
elite social cont ro l . 3 One potential pressure 
group for reform of the abortion law had arisen 
as family planning associations came into 
being in several provinces, because the pre-
1969 law prohibited not only abortion but also 
the dissemination of information about any 
form of contraception. Th is latter prohibit ion 
was also essentially unenforced; pharmaceuti-
cal companies advertised, doctors prescribed 
and drug stores sold contraceptives. 4 T h e state 
was thus a silent partner to both systems of fer-
tility control systems—abortion and con-
traception. 
A n informal abortion system had evolved 
within some Canadian hospitals where abor-
tions were performed on a daily basis . 5 These 
hospitals established abortion committees, 
usually consisting of three to five doctors, who 
met in camera. N o reliable statistics were kept, 
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but strict quotas were imposed by these com-
mittees to avoid their hospitals' gaining 
reputations for being lenient on abortion. The 
abortion committees served to diffuse respon-
sibility for decisions made by the individual 
doctor. Such decisions reflected physicians' 
personal moral standards and class biases, 
while relieving them of personal respon-
s ib i l i ty . 6 T h e committees further diffused 
responsibility by acting in the name of their 
hospitals, thus lending an aura of respectability 
to the entire illegal system. T h i s helped to 
rationalize on personal and compassionate 
grounds those abortions actually performed as 
favors to friends and community elites. But 
fraud was often necessary, as one knowledge-
able physican and official in the federal De-
partment of Health and Welfare related: 
"There were 'emergency appendectomies' in 
Catholic hospitals and 'menstrual irregulari-
ties' requir ing D and C s (dilation and cure-
tage) ." 7 A n d there is no record of prosecutions 
against validly licensed individual doctors or 
against accredited hospitals. 8 Under this 
system abortion in the first trimester of 
pregnancy came to be safer than carrying a 
pregnancy to term; and the few women that 
were helped by the pre-1969 system were 
served very discretely and effectively. 
Mounting Pressure on the State 
W h e n political pressures in the 1960s forced 
the issue onto the national agenda, the state 
was forced to respond. Feminist and other ac-
tivist reformers demanded open access to abor-
t ion. Pro-life groups, supported and guided by 
the hierarchy of the R o m a n Catholic Church , 
insisted that the government retain (and later 
reinstate) the absolute ban. Doctors were badly 
exposed and caught in the middle, since their 
abortion practices were the issue. The Cana-
dian Medica l Association sought relief by 
proposing a C r i m i n a l Code amendment to 
preserve its members' monopoly over the 
delivery of abortion services and to protect the 
doctors and their hospitals from legal l iabil i ty. 
The state, already in a delicate position, faced 
a di lemma. 
The federal government's reaction was com-
plex. It chose to give public symbolic support 
to the reformers, while also giving quiet 
reassurance to the pro-life movement. The 
government's strategy was to attempt to en-
sure that no effective state action would offend 
any faction. It legitimized the doctors' de facto 
autonomy and generally tried to steer the con-
troversy away from the federal government 
and the governing party caucus. Without 
legalizing abortion, the 1969 reform law en-
shrined the rhetoric of reform while basically 
just legalizing established medical practices. 
The 1969 reform law's inequities quickly 
became obvious to committed feminists as well 
as to the highly moblized pro-life movement. 
Both sides challenged the medical profession's 
autonomy. Should pro-abortion activists pre-
va i l , the medical profession's monopoly over 
the delivery of medical services would be 
seriously eroded; doctors would be reduced to 
providing their services like entrepreneurs, 
" o n demand" . Pro-life activists, on the other 
hand, threatened the l imited abortion reform 
that met the needs of the middle class. Both 
sides pressed their case on the federal govern-
ment. H a v i n g failed to dampen the issue, the 
government resorted to manoeuvres designed 
to shift public perceptions of further political 
responsibility to act away from itself and onto 
the Canadian Medica l Association ( C M A ) and 
the provinces. A t the same time, the federal 
government tried to contain the socially ex-
plosive conflict between pro-and anti-abortion 
forces at the federal level. Al though this com-
bination of moves was very much in the 
tradition of the politics of Canadian federal-
i s m 9 , for a time the process of elite ac-
commodation was sorely strained. 
Usual ly such manoeuvres are virtually in -
visible. " N o r m a l " policy issues are resolved 
through a process of elite accommodation in 
which participants share common ideological 
assumptions regarding the scope of acceptable 
choices and the rules governing change. 1 0 The 
process leaves the public with almost no 
political role beyond that of spectator. Not 
knowing how or where to intervene, the public 
typically becomes, at most, the audience for 
staged conflict that accompanies gentlemanly 
agreement. O n abortion, however, the ex-
treme public polarization made normal elite 
accommodation very difficult to manage. The 
state struggled to maintain an elite-permissive 
status quo under conditions where traditional 
elite accommodation for once proved in-
sufficient to enable elites to maintain their con-
trol over public perceptions and definitions of 
the issue. Further, the elites' ability to main-
tain control over future events surrounding the 
issue was weakened. 
As the political debate arose in the 1960s, the 
elites' inability to control the issue was reflect-
ed in the position taken by the medical 
profession. The C M A ' s informal abortion 
practices were threatened because its effects 
were exposed to public scrutiny. The C M A ' s 
organizational needs, rather than any desire to 
make abortions available to more women, 
motivated its call in 1966 for abortions to 
become legal: 
a) where it is performed by a duly l i -
censed medical practitioner after con-
sultation with and approval of a hospital 
appointed therapeutic abortion com-
mittee, b) i f performed in an active treat-
ment hospital, c) if performed with the 
written consent of the spouse or guardian 
where the committee deems necessary, d) 
where the continuance of the pregnancy 
may endanger the life or physical health 
of the mother . 1 1 
Eventually the abortion debate became part of 
the C M A ' s internal politics, and its public 
positions reflected shifting power balances be-
tween pro-and anti-abortion advocates as each 
faction tried to control abortion policy by con-
trolling the C M A . Its 1966 resolution, de-
signed to protect all physicians, soon threat-
ened to tear the C M A apart from w i t h i n . 1 2 
Liberal Member of Parliament Ian W a h n in-
troduced the C M A ' s proposal in the House of 
Commons in October, 1967, as a private mem-
ber's b i l l . W a h n said his bi l l sought "to declare 
what the existing law actually is and to make it 
entirely clear that doctors are entitled to per-
form therapeutic abortions which are necessary 
to preserve either the life or health of the 
w o m a n . " 1 3 W i t h small but significant 
changes, the C M A ' s resolution became the 
1969 abortion reform law. 
T h e Reforms of 1969 and Responses to 
T h e m 
The Commons ' Standing Committee on 
Health and Welfare had begun in December of 
1966 a review of the proposals to amend sec-
tion 357 of the C r i m i n a l Code banning the ad-
vertisement and sale of "any means" of birth 
control. In what became part of the 1969 
reform, it recommended that "dissemination 
of family planning information should be com-
pletely free of illegality as a matter of personal 
c h o i c e . " 1 4 Here, then, were the bases for 
clearing the legal obstacsles to creating an 
abortion/fertility policy. 
The medical profession and the federal 
government held largely compatible interests 
in 1969 in wanting a law to resolve shared elite 
concerns over l iabili ty and control without 
changing the current practice of restricted ac-
cess. For the doctors, the new law represented 
an important victory. The government's ob-
jectives were more subtle. In adopting what 
was otherwise a copy of the 1966 C M A 
proposal, the government refused to define 
"hea l th " or to mention "consent" as the 
C M A had wanted. The new law did specify 
that abortions would be permitted only in 
provincial ly accredited or approved hospitals. 
Each of these changes was designed to l imit 
federal responsibility. 
The 1969 law's complicated procedures en-
sured l imited access to abortion but without ex-
plicit policy. The political burden still lay with 
individual doctors and their committees, who 
had to define "hea l th" case-by-case, and 
decide when "consent" was needed. The law 
also reminded activists on both sides of the 
issue that provinces accredited hospitals and 
thereby controlled overall availability of abor-
tion services. In fact, the federal stance went 
further; it was never to deviate from the argu-
ment that if more abortions were desired than 
were available, the fault now lay elsewhere, 
with the doctors and provincial governments. 
In 1975 the federal government still main-
tained that " A b o r t i o n as a health matter, 
comes under provincial jur isdict ion. However , 
as the termination of fetal life is involved, some 
legal aspects come within the terms of the 
Federal C r i m i n a l Code. The federal role is 
thus l imited and spec i f i c . " 1 5 By formalizing 
past practice, along with the social inequities, 
the reform law exacerbated the real social 
problem. W o m e n , naturally wanting to avoid 
the dangers of illegal abortions or the time and 
expense involved in leaving Canada, got false 
encouragement. 1 6 The law required hospitals 
to maintain accurate statistics, so abortion 
demand appeared to increase dramat ica l ly . 1 7 
Anti-abort ion forces blamed the apparent in -
crease on the law itself and attacked wide-
spread use of artificial contraception. They 
pressed for a return of the absolute legal ban, 
and opposed family planning programmes at 
the federal and local level, arguing that abor-
tion and birth control eroded traditional social 
values and institutions. Pro-abortion advocates 
focused on the law's inequities and the health 
hazards of illegal abortions, and demanded 
further C r i m i n a l Code changes plus an 
aggressive federal programme promoting con-
traception. They justified their demands on the 
basis of the civi l right of women to self-
determined fertility control. 
The federal government had suffered no 
illusions that the issue would be resolved at the 
stroke of a pen. A further means of issue con-
tainment would be needed to help deflect the 
political heat away from the government and a 
badly divided Libera l Party caucus. The 
politically explosive nature of birth control, 
coupled with dissatisfaction over the abortion 
reform, meant that the federal response had to 
be cast in the narrowest terms possible. Fur-
ther, all sides had to be reassured of the gov-
ernment's sympathetic concern. Final ly , the 
federal government had to steer a solution 
without appearing to impose one beyond its 
elite-permissive policy. 
The Federal Government's Structural 
Response: The Family Planning Division 
In Canada, affairs o f state expand or (more 
rarely) contract so easily that it is difficult to 
determine precisely what is public and what is 
private. The state now moved to expand, first 
by creating a bureaucratic structure for sym-
bolic reassurances to all sides of the dispute, 
and then by recruiting private groups on each 
side of the issue. The groups had to be ones 
that the government could support, establish 
liaison with, and use informally as a means for 
collecting information. The federal govern-
ment also had to be able to guide and steer 
each faction. The steering agency was called 
the Fami ly Planning Div i s ion ( F P D ) , and the 
private groups were voluntary associa-
tions—particularly the Planned Parenthood 
Federation of Canada ( P P F C ) and the Service 
de Regulation des Naissances (Serena). 
The P P F C was to become an important in-
strument in the state's strategy to contain the 
abortion issue. The process was one the state 
has often followed, essentially to inspire, some-
times even to create, an interest group to make 
claims upon its resources. 1 8 From 1972, gov-
ernment funds literally transformed the P P F C 
and Serena from struggling local operations in-
to full-blown national organizations. Both or-
ganizations operated within the dominant ide-
ology of the liberal state, aiming primari ly at 
reducing the disparity between the principle of 
universal access to contraception and the 
existing maldistribution within society. Being 
very largely dependent on federal government 
funding, both organizations were subject to 
manipulation. Supporting these organizations 
enabled the government to encourage that side 
of the reform movement most closely aligned 
with rather cautious incremental changes. 
In A p r i l of 1969, John M u n r o , Minis ter of 
National Health and Welfare, seized upon a 
request from the P P F C for a national con-
ference on family planning to create the Family 
Planning Divis ion in his Department. The 
Divis ion ' s terms of reference were rewritten 
twice at the Minis ter ia l level to restrict its man-
date as much as possible while giving the ap-
pearance of ac t ion . 1 9 Four basic political 
requirements underpinned the F P D ' s opera-
tions: 1) abortion would not be considered an 
acceptable method of birth control; 2) con-
traceptive use must be governed by the pr in-
ciple of free choice within the context of family 
life (hence the name Family Planning D i v i -
sion); 3) there would no be fertility research 
and no population policy established, and 4) 
the division would not initiate or promote birth 
control programmes but only respond to re-
quests for information. According to the F P D ' s 
own internal evaluation, "It would appear that 
two major reasons for [its minimal terms of 
reference] were the sensitive nature of the sub-
ject matter itself and concern with respect to 
federal-provincial r e la t ions . " 2 0 
Despite the Minis ter ' s caution, the Cabinet 
Committee on Social Policy rejected M u n r o ' s 
first F P D proposal on October 25, 1969. "I t 
seems evident ," M u n r o later wrote to the 
P P F C , "that however simple the amendment 
to the C r i m i n a l Code appeared to be, its ac-
complishment was not an easy one and it be-
came evident that some time needed to elapse 
to permit the government to take any more 
positive a c t i o n . " 2 1 H e tried again nine months 
later, recommending that, "Cabine t approve 
as a national policy a concept of family plan-
ning which respects individual choice, religious 
and ethical beliefs [including] grants in aid and 
contract research with outside persons and 
agencies, a family planning training pro-
gramme, dissemination of family planning in -
format ion," and he recommended establishing 
a family planning unit within the Department 
of National Health and Wel fa re . 2 2 Cabinet ap-
proved the recommendation but excluded a 
"concept of family planning as national pol i-
c y , " agreeing to support only "the right of 
Canadians to exercise free individual choice in 
the practice of family p l a n n i n g . " 2 3 Cabinet 
refused to authorize additional funds for the 
F P D , but directed Health and Welfare to draw 
resources from " lower priority activities" 
within the department. The Family Planning 
Div is ion did not actually begin operating until 
1972, but without being fully staffed then or 
since. 
Throughout its operational life, the F P D 
was l imited by the government to a passive, 
reactive posture vis-a-vis the Canadian public: 
" A n official policy, central to F P D ' s operation 
is that it responds to demands for, rather than 
actively promoting family planning informa-
t i o n . " 2 4 Responsibility for initiation and 
promotion was left to the provinces: " O r g a n i -
zation and administration of family planning 
programmes wil l be assumed primari ly at the 
provincial l e v e l . " 2 5 The Government l imited 
its role to supporting only educational services 
on request: 
The effort of informing Canadians is in 
terms of education rather than per-
suasion, remembering that education is 
an attempt to expand the knowledge of 
the population so they can make rational 
choices from alternatives while per-
suasion tries to l imit choices and control 
perceived alternatives of the popu la t ion . 2 6 
The F P D took no action at the grass-roots 
level, and was never designed to effect be-
havioural or demographic changes in the 
population at large. 
This is not to say that the federal govern-
ment made no assumptions regarding which 
part of the population should receive birth con-
trol information; it d id . T h e Cabinet wanted 
F P D programmes directed toward low income 
groups that it knew were not being served by 
its restrictive abortion policy. Spreading know-
ledge about contraception among the poor 
would relieve social welfare costs and the 
demand for abortion: 
There is a well established association 
between family size and socio-economic 
status, maternal and child health, cul-
tural deprivation, and educational ac-
hievement. Fami ly planning therefore 
would contribute positively towards 
ameliorating the problems facing lower 
socio-economic families by controlling the 
birth of unwanted offspring . . . A n active 
family planning policy would also have 
the salutory effect of decreasing requests 
for induced abortions, including illegal 
abortions, which are still prevalent 
despite the recent amendment to the 
cr iminal code on abor t ion . 2 7 
T h e government, however, knew it could not 
publicly target the poor without producing a 
political reaction from minori ty groups—that 
it was imposing a solution on them while 
leaving the luxury of choice to the middle 
classes: 
A t present, persons from higher economic 
strata of society are much better informed 
and have far better access to family plan-
ning information and materials than per-
sons in the low economic environment. 
Dissemination of family planning in -
formation should be comprehensive and 
widespread to give access to all segments 
of the population. A programme of this 
nature would serve to allay the fears of 
minori ty groups especially our Indian 
popula t ion . 2 8 
N H W also believed a policy of active 
promotion of birth control might "increase 
demand beyond the level of available re-
>>29 
sources. 
Problems with Implementation 
In M a y of 1970, a group of women chained 
themselves to chairs in the Parliamentary Press 
Gallery demanding abortion on demand and 
forcing the House of Commons to adjourn its 
sitting. Both the Canadian Psychiatric Associ-
ation and the C M A criticized the hospital com-
mittee system, and in 1971 the C M A retaliated 
against the government's efforts to focus 
responsibility on doctors by recommending 
that reference to abortion committees be 
eliminated from the C r i m i n a l C o d e . 3 0 The 
Roya l Commiss ion on the Status of Women 
criticized the law's discriminatory effect, and 
called on the government to permit abortion 
on request within the first trimester (12 weeks) 
of pregnancy. 3 1 It was becoming increasingly 
difficult for the state to control, within the 1969 
compromise reforms, the growing political 
protest generated by its elite-permissive abor-
tion policy. 
Between 1972 and 1979, each of the F P D ' s 
three major programme activities was ren-
dered largely ineffective by political inter-
ference. The program activities were: the 
distr ibution of informational-educational 
materials on family planning and sex educa-
tion; the provision (on request) of consultative 
services to the private sector, local government 
and other federal departments (such as Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development) which 
might have an interest in birth control policy; 
and the creation of a family planning grants 
program to support voluntary associations, 
local government agencies and university 
based research. 
Although the Cabinet wanted F P D pro-
grammes directed towards the poor, its actual 
constituency consisted primari ly of pro-
fessional elites. Sixty percent of its publications 
went to educational institutions, municipal 
health units and P P F C affiliates. Provincial 
government departments ranked sixth (behind 
hospitals and social service agencies) in terms 
of publ ica t ions sent by the F P D . 3 2 
Organizations accounted for 65% of the F P D ' s 
literature, and the individuals who received the 
remainder were largely professionals. The 
Divis ion devoted the major portion of its 
operational budget to information pamphlets 
(half of which were produced within the De-
partment, and the other half contracted out) on 
such subjects as general bir th control techni-
ques, sex education and family life. At no time 
did the F P D distribute information on abor-
tion, pregnancy counselling, or referral . 3 3 
Several operational restrictions inhibited the 
F P D ' s effectiveness in reaching even its limited 
constituency. The Divis ion mailed only specif-
ically requested items. It maintained a bibliog-
raphy but would not distribute it unless specif-
ically requested. 3 4 Its attentive public was 
largely unable to use the Divis ion 's services ef-
fectively: " A recurring comment (30%) ex-
pressed by leading figures was that F P D had a 
very low profile and did not advertise enough; 
and thus did not reach a wide enough segment 
of professional organizations and agenc ies . " 3 5 
In responding to requests, delays of up to six 
months were not uncommon. Censorship by 
the exceptionally cautious senior management 
frequently interfered with the wri t ing process, 
or delayed publication. One author under con-
tract expressed a typical frustration: "I t took 
them [FPD] four years to publish a brochure 
they paid me to write for them. The i r excuse 
was that it was too controversial to p u b l i s h . " 3 6 
Delays and censorship rendered much of the 
Divis ion 's material obsolescent before it was 
released. Consequently the overall demand for 
"general bir th con t ro l" and "young people" 
publications dropped between 1973 and 1977 
as users switched to Amer ican mater ia ls . 3 7 
Inadequate staffing also severely l imited the 
Divis ion 's performance. The Cabinet did not 
permit the F P D to hire fertility planning con-
sultants. Instead, consultants in community 
education, social work and nursing were sup-
posed to provide technical advice to provincial 
and voluntary agencies. However , between 
J u l y 1974 and December 1976 the consultant 
positions were vacant 34% of the time. The 
position of community education consultant, 
who was to alert local agencies to the F P D 
material, was left vacant for eight months. The 
"resource centre officer" was down-graded to 
a clerical position, el iminating responsibilities 
for wri t ing pamphlets and for representing the 
Department at family planning conferences. 3 8 
Staff turnover was frequent and the Div i s ion 
did not inform its constituency of staff changes 
or revised job descriptions. A committee 
(known as the Badgley Commission) that was 
created in 1975 to review the operation of the 
abortion law reported that c iv i l servants who 
developed an interest and competence in the 
abortion issue were likely to find themselves 
transferred to other dut ies . 3 9 
A s the Divis ion came under increasingly 
hostile political attack, consultants were given 
less authority to make decisions. By 1977, at 
the height of the abortion debate rekindled by 
M a r c Lalonde (who by then was Minis ter of 
Nat ional Heal th and Welfare) and the Badgley 
Commiss ion , the F P D ' s consultants were de-
voting the bulk of their time to ministerial cor-
respondence. 4 0 Consequently the credibility of 
the Divis ion ' s consultant services was quite 
low among professionals and organizations. 
F P D ' s internal evaluation concluded "that the 
impact and consequently the effectiveness of 
the consultation component had been modest 
. . . the extent to which the service has been de-
livered to the respondent group is very low in -
deed compared to the need they express ." 4 1 
T h e F P D dispersed its family planning 
grants under several categories: demon-
stration, service, training, fellowship and 
research, and sustaining. Grant recipients 
were expected to use federal funds as "seed 
money" and to switch to provincial govern-
ment support once the project proved viable. A 
series of checks was imposed on the granting 
process to ensure that F P D money went to 
noncontroversial projects which d id not in -
volve basic fertility questions or abortion 
referral. The Div is ion referred project ap-
plications to a government official from the 
province where the application originated to 
ensure that the F P D did not fund projects 
which might embarrass a provincial govern-
ment. Provinces were given an opportunity to 
indicate i f the project conflicted with their 
policies and whether they would be wi l l ing to 
provide continued support. M o r e than half of 
the applicants for F P D grants were asked to 
alter their applicat ions. 4 2 Th is helps to explain 
the absence of projects which dealt with abor-
tion—applicants were asked i f their projects 
dealt with abortion, and i f so, to revise their 
submissions. 4 3 Recipients whose projects at-
tracted unfavourable press attention or 
irritated M . P . s by involving abortion referral 
were threatened with loss of financial support. 
The federal government specifically exclud-
ed the conducting of research from the F P D ' s 
operations because of fear of right-wing 
charges that it was preparing a fertility policy. 
N o in-depth national or provincial research 
existed concerning the scope or nature of the 
problem of unwanted pregnancies, public at-
titudes toward fertility, or the enormous defi-
ciencies (reported by the Badgley Commission) 
in the delivery of family planning services. The 
Divis ion d id support some university-based 
demographic research for "knowledge, at-
titude and practice", studies to evaluate need, 
and studies of delivery methods at the local 
level. 4 4 Al though researchers, like other grant 
recipients, were required to submit reports of 
their work, the Divis ion never published the 
findings of research completed under its 
auspices; it (including the bibliography) was 
classified and locked away . 4 5 The public 
gained almost nothing at the cost of almost ten 
mil l ion dollars over six years, but the federal 
government succeeded in this way in siphoning 
off and controlling a great deal of information 
which might otherwise have contributed to the 
political debate. The Divis ion acted not only to 
steer university research as to subject area, but 
also to confine its dissemination. 
The F P D believed that municipal and 
provincial government agencies would draw 
heavily on its grant programme, but they 
proved as reluctant as the federal government 
to openly enter this political minefield. M u n i c -
ipal and provincial government agencies ac-
counted for only 7.4% and 20% respectively of 
total available F P D grant funds. 4 6 " A major 
diff iculty," according to a National Health 
and Welfare internal memorandum, " i s the 
reluctance of provincial and municipal govern-
ments to publicize resources available through 
their health and welfare services. Depart-
mental officials are generally instructed to 
provide information and make referrals only at 
the request of the c l ien t . 4 7 
In 1978, officials in the Family Planning 
Div is ion tried to get provincial officials who 
had responsibilities for fertility policy to pro-
duce their own materials on pregnancy preven-
tion. The impact of prevention on abortion 
demand had been made explicit by the 1979 
report of the (Badgley) Committee on the 
Operation of the Abor t ion L a w . As one federal 
official noted, " W e tried to concentrate on the 
P R side of prevention. The idea was to get the 
provinces to produce their own material on 
family planning and sex education rather than 
rely on Heal th and Welfare which was finding 
it increasingly difficult to provide materials 
and distribute them under the Liberal Govern-
m e n t . " 4 8 Provincial officials were universally 
negative. " T h e y argued that they couldn't 
possibly get such an idea through their minis-
ters because to produce their own material 
would direct the political flak back on to them. 
Everyone wanted the federal government to 
continue producing the material and take the 
political heat, while they received the stuff for 
free, of course." 4 9 
Government and Interest Groups 
The most sophisticated and astute of all the 
F P D ' s issue-containment operations was to 
provide sustaining grants to the Planned Par-
enthood Federation of Canada and the Service 
de Regulation des Naissances (Serena). The 
federal government considered the P P F C to be 
a very important organization, and until the 
dismantling of the Family Planning Divis ion in 
1978, a very close association developed bet-
ween the two. The P P F C actively promoted 
the use of all forms of birth control, provided 
counsel l ing and conducted communi ty 
education campaigns. Between 1972 and 1976, 
P P F C received $2,157,000, 37% of the total 
F P D grant budget. This was the largest single 
grant given by the Department to any national 
organization. These funds enabled the P P F C 
to establish a national headquarters and create 
additional local affiliates. The latter eventually 
accounted for 39% of the Divis ion 's demon-
stration, service and training grants . 3 0 
The P P F C national headquarters eagerly 
sought a close collaborative relationship with 
the F P D by keeping it informed of prospective 
plans and activities. The headquarters also 
coordinated the otherwise independent ac-
tivities of local affiliates to keep them informed 
about federal policy. But the F P D did not 
reciprocate equally. Relations with the 
Federation's frontline staff were cordial , but 
the P P F C had no influence upon the federal 
government's policy making. O n one occasion 
the Department requested the Federation to 
evaluate the F P D ' s operations. However , the 
Department refused to give all of its opinions 
on the study, and refused to provide the P P F C 
with a copy of its own internal evaluation of the 
Fami ly Planning D i v i s i o n . 5 1 
The federal government used the P P F C to 
carry out the public sector promotional func-
tion that was prohibited to the F P D . Thus the 
P P F C carried out activities that were too poli t i-
cally controversial for the government. For 
example, the Department used the P P F C to 
pressure provincial governments to assume a 
larger role in family planning under the terms 
of the federal Social Services Act being 
developed in 1976. Health and Welfare offici-
als urged the P P F C to lobby the provinces "so 
that when it comes time for provincial minis-
ters of welfare to discuss family planning ser-
vices, they have about the same definitions as 
we [ N H W and P P F C ] h a v e . " 5 2 
The federal government considered Serena, 
which was a much smaller organization than 
the P P F C , to be of essentially symbolic i m -
portance, but that importance was sufficient, 
however, to warrant $677,000, or 11% of the 
F P D ' s grant budget over four years . 5 3 Serena 
advocated only the symptothermic method of 
birth control which requires periodic ab-
stinence from sexual intercourse, that being 
the only method of birth control fully com-
patible with the teachings of the R o m a n 
Catholic Church . Thus , Serena d id not meet 
the fundamental criterion that grant recipients 
provide public information on all methods of 
contraception. However , supporting Serena 
was politically attractive. It pleased the R o m a n 
Catholic hierarchy and deflected protests of 
pro-life groups which considered artificial con-
traception immora l . F P D made this point to 
senior management: 
F r o m a cost-benefit point of view, 
assistance to Serena may be questioned 
on two grounds—the effectiveness of its 
method of choice and its l imited appeal. 
O n the other hand, it may prove to be the 
most acceptable method to a significant 
minori ty of Canadians . . . . Substantial 
support of Serena wi l l validate the gov-
ernment's claim that it wishes to ensure 
Canadians a free choice of family plan-
ning methods consistent with the varied 
cultural and religious pattern of this 
coun t ry . 5 4 
The Family P lanning Div i s ion played a key 
role in the federal government's issue con-
tainment strategy. Through the F P D , the 
government sent reassuring messages to both 
sides in the contraception/abortion debate 
while doing almost nothing. Reform activists 
were sent the encouraging message that the 
government recognized their cause and their 
definition of the social problem. They were en-
couraged to believe that the government would 
address the consequences of its own iniquitous 
abortion policy by doing something tangible in 
the area of family planning. A t the same time, 
conservative pro-life groups were somewhat 
mollified by the fact that the F P D neither con-
sidered abortion an acceptable form of birth 
control, nor intended to persuade individuals 
to practice fertility control. Instead, the F P D 
endorsed a "concept of family planning 
whereby a couple may decide according to their 
own beliefs and consciences, whether they want 
to use family planning methods to prevent un-
wanted pregnancies ." 5 5 The family, not the 
individual , was thus the central unit of con-
traceptive decision making. Pro-life groups 
could not make too much out of the charge that 
the state threatened the natural role of women 
or traditional institutions. Funding the P P F C 
and Serena provided the government with a 
barometer to gauge public sentiment, monitor 
the impact of its limited programme, and 
especially to legitimize and extend its par-
ticular and narrow concept of family planning 
against demands for more sweeping changes. 
The F P D itself conducted a shadow pro-
gramme, being prohibited from developing a 
fertility policy or promoting contraception. It 
could only respond to requests for information, 
which it carefully censored and delayed. It 
acted through professional elites rather than on 
the population directly. It had "consultants" 
that did not consult, but instead operated as 
political firemen to chastise grant recipients 
who annoyed an M . P . or Cabinet minister. 
The Family Planning Divis ion did not succeed 
in drawing pro- and anti-reform protests away 
from the government and safely on to the bu-
reaucracy. The increasing number of abor-
tions, coupled with the 1969 reform inequities, 
made the F P D itself the target of the mounting 
political controversy, attacked by one side for 
favoring immoral birth control and by the 
other side for its ineffectiveness. 
The Morgentaler Challenge 
A major challenge to the federal govern-
ment's containment strategy came in 1973 
from D r . Henry Morgentaler who subjected 
the abortion policy to punishing publicity. H e 
admitted performing over 5,000 abortions for 
poor people on request in his clinic and pub-
lished his practice openly in the Canadian 
Medica l Association's Journal. In this sense he 
was not respectable. Arrested for violating the 
abortion law, he based his defence on Section 
45 of the C r i m i n a l Code which protects anyone 
from criminal liability for an operation done 
with care to protect the patient's health. He 
was acquitted; but when the C r o w n appealed, 
the verdict was reversed. Morgentaler went to 
prison for 18 months while his case went to the 
Supreme Cour t . In a split 6-3 decision of that 
Cour t , he was pronounced guilty of not ap-
plying the 1969 reform law. Whi le in prison, 
he was charged again. This time, basing his 
defence on the common law concept of 
necessity, he was again acquitted. Morgen-
taler's case became a cause ceTebre that spot-
lighted the federal government's responsibility 
in the eyes of activists for either permitting 
abortions or restricting them. Morgentaler 's 
act was a political one which threatened state 
control by opening the door to abortion on 
demand. 
Justice Minis ter Otto Lang intervened, con-
sistent with past federal practice, by shifting 
responsibility away from the government. H e 
warned the medical profession that too many 
abortions threatened the 1969 compromise by 
generating political controversy directed at the 
government. Unless the medical profession 
restricted the number of abortions, the strategy 
of containment, which served the interests of 
both the doctors and the state, could be lost. 
Through a ministerial memorandum issued in 
October 1974, he declared that the abortion 
law was to be applied "strictly: that social and 
economic considerations were not to be taken 
into account in determining whether a 
pregnancy lawfully could be t e rmina ted . " 5 6 
According to an official in the National Health 
and Welfare Department, " L a n g tried to in-
timidate hospitals by warning their adminis-
tration against too liberal application of the 
abortion law. The warning went out as a con-
fidential memo, but of course it was l e a k e d . " 5 ' 
M a n y wonder why Lang so openly tried in-
timidation. The reason wi l l probably never 
become clear; he was accused of allowing his 
personal beliefs to interfere with his ministerial 
duties. But it is clear that his department was 
taking the political heat generated by Morgen-
taler's tr ial . It is more likely, therefore, that he 
over-reacted and confused his role as a mem-
ber of the Government and his role as depart-
ment head. A s a Government member his job 
was containment of the issues, but as head of 
the Justice Department he had to respond to 
the legal challenge raised by Morgentaler . 
The medical profession retaliated i m -
mediately. C M A President D r . Bette Stephen-
son complained directly to Pr ime Minis ter 
Trudeau , demanded an official definition of 
"hea l th" , and threatened that doctors might 
withdraw from abortion committees: " T o ask 
these physicians to continue to serve in this 
capacity under the condemnation and implied 
threats of the Minis te r of Justice is u n f a i r . " 5 8 
In reply, Trudeau pointedly reminded the 
C M A that it had little grounds for complaint: 
most o f the provisions of the law were 
significantly influenced by the recom-
mendations of the Canadian Medica l 
Association in 1966 and 1967 . . . . I do 
not see any way abortion committee 
decisions can be avoided, even given 
some iron clad definition in the law of the 
concept of "hea l th" . N o matter what 
wording of any such definition might be, 
the decisions of the hospital abortion 
committees would still concern very dif-
ficult human situations. In fact, one of the 
benefits of not having a r ig id definition of 
conditions under which hospital abortions 
may or may not be performed is that it 
leaves sufficient latitude for hospital abor-
tion committees to make just decisions in 
the many borderline and unique cases 
which inevitably wi l l arise in the course of 
the committee's del iberat ions. 5 9 
O n January 9, 1975 Stephenson publicly called 
for Justice Minis te r Lang 's resignation unless 
he clarified government policy. 
Lang 's statement generated additional con-
troversy at the time that the federal govern-
merit was trying to dampen it, and so he had to 
deny it: " I have made it clear that health is a 
broad word that certainly includes mental and 
other fac tors ." 6 0 The price extracted by the 
medical profession for his change of view was a 
formal government inquiry into the entire 
question o f abortion, " inc lud ing a patient 
profile, guidelines for facilities, procedures and 
pe r sonne l . " 6 1 In September, 1975, the govern-
ment appointed the Committee on the 
Operation of the Abor t ion L a w under the 
chairmanship of R o b i n F . Badgley. 
The Badgley Committee on Abortion Law 
The Committee was a creature of the federal 
Justice Department which was responsible for 
the operation of the abortion law (but not fer-
tility policy) and which had opposed all at-
tempts to make abortions available to every-
one. It drew the Committee 's terms of refer-
ence very narrowly to ensure that the final 
report would not condemn the government. 
The Committee could not analyze or make 
recommendations on the underlying policy of 
the l a w . 6 2 The Justice Department employed 
Badgley for the same purpose that the Depart-
ment of Nat ional Heal th and Welfare used the 
F P D — t o deflect the political controversy away 
from the government and on to a " n e u t r a l " 
commission; a strategy carefully designed from 
the beginning to give the rhetoric to reformers 
and the policy to elites. A l l sides—doctors, pro-
and anti-reformers, and the Provinces—would 
make their case to the Committee rather than 
to the federal government, which, for its part 
of course, would remain silent lest it interfere 
with the Committee 's work. 
T o be credible, the Badgley Committee 
could not deny the obvious social problem 
caused by the government's elite-permissive 
abortion policy. A considerable struggle oc-
curred over exactly how it could explain the 
abortion problem without implici t ly cri t icizing 
the abortion law. A s one witness to many of the 
early manoeuvrings put it, "There was blood 
in the halls over what it [the Committee] would 
actually do. N o way would Justice allow it to 
find fault with the law. The government 
was not about to blame itself. That 's why the 
supporting studies are still locked up in the 
v a u l t s . " 6 3 The formula to resolve the difficulty 
for the Committee came in the form of a 
national patient survey which detailed the 
epidemiological nature of abortion, but 
blamed medical, hospital and provincial ob-
stacles for preventing the law's equitable 
operation. 
The Committee 's primary conclusion repro-
duced exactly the federal government's claim 
that responsibility for abortion policy d id not 
rest at the federal level: "It is not the law that 
has led to the inequities in its operation or the 
sharp disparities in how therapeutic abortions 
are obtained by women within cities, regions, 
or provinces. It is the Canadian people, their 
health institutions, and the medical profession, 
who are responsible for this s i t ua t ion . " 6 4 
Cabinet alerted the Department of National 
Health and Welfare to the Report in Decem-
ber, 1976, three months before its release, and 
directed them to not refer to the report publicly 
except in response to direct inquiries, and then 
to cite only this conclus ion . 6 5 The Fami ly Plan-
ning Divis ion 's Director backed this with a 
directive to F P D people to remain silent about 
the repor t . 6 6 Th is was not merely because of 
the law's gross inequities. Previous studies had 
reported the grief and frustration forced upon 
women who sought a legal abor t ion . 6 7 This 
time, the report's official status and excellent 
documentation generated intense political 
pressure from all sides of the abortion debate. 
That pressure was directed not on the Justice 
Department, but on National Health and 
Welfare and the F P D . 
The Badgley Report d id link the high de-
mand for induced abortion with systematic de-
ficiencies in federal government policies ad-
ministered by the F P D , especially "diffuse and 
ineffective" efforts in public education on con-
traception. The Report argued convincingly 
for a national population policy, which had 
been specifically removed from the F P D ' s 
terms of reference. Final ly , the Report clearly 
l inked the reduction of abortions to effective 
prevention: " T h e critical social choices are 
between two sensitive issues, induced abortion 
and family planning . . . . The results of this 
inquiry clearly indicate the need for greater 
public effort and more resources to be allocated 
by all levels of government and voluntary 
associations for the support of family planning 
p r o g r a m s . " 6 8 These conclusions could not be 
ignored, but the Family Planning Divis ion 's 
response set it on a collision course with other 
politically oriented sectors of the federal gov-
ernment, particularly the Prime Minis ter ' s Of-
fice and Cabinet, which were determined to 
keep the federal profile as low as possible. 
Initially, opinions were divided within the 
F P D over how to respond to the Badgley 
Report . Some feared that widespread 
distribution of the report would only produce 
additional political pressure on the Divis ion to 
expand its activities, which i n turn would 
mobilize anti-abortion groups. One senior of-
ficial attacked the Badgley Report: " B i r t h con-
trol information is readily available from doc-
tors as is abortion counselling. There is no 
necessity for the federal government to become 
involved with activist programmes of dissemi-
nation of birth control information. Most 
women's anxieties over pregnancy are better 
dealt with by a psychia t r i s t . " 6 9 Others in the 
Div is ion thought that the Report provided a 
"po l icy w i n d o w " through which the govern-
ment could respond: "Badgley is a preventive 
mandate. It legitimizes a preventive strategy 
which fits perfectly with what we are trying to 
do. Its horrible findings, especially in the last 
chapter, demonstrate that nothing is being 
done i n the area of prevention and clearly links 
prevention with curative treatment. Fifty 
thousand copies of that report ought to be 
everywhere . " 7 0 
T h e P o l i t i c a l Response to the Badgley 
Repor t 
M a r c Lalonde, Minis te r of National Heal th 
and Welfare when the Badgley Report was 
tabled, reluctantly opted for the strategy of 
pregnancy prevention. The Report had so 
aroused the public that another gesture by the 
Fami ly Planning Div is ion was necessary in or-
der for it to continue to contain and deflect the 
controversy away from the government. 
Lalonde had already informed (in late A p r i l of 
1975) provincial ministers of welfare that 
family planning services were not a priority in 
his department, but now he could not appear 
insensitive to the government's own findings. 
Accord ing to one National Heal th and Welfare 
official, "Attempts to alter the provisions of 
the C r i m i n a l Code were politically risky. We 
knew he could not move Cabinet on that 
p o i n t . " 7 1 The Div is ion did not change its 
research programme, and proposals to resur-
rect the national fertility survey were axed 
early, thereby eliminating the possibility of the 
national population policy which the Badgley 
Report considered a sine qua non of any effec-
tive preventive strategy. " T h e Minis ter 
feared," according to one senior manager, 
"that a [fertility] survey would draw attacks by 
anti-abortion elements who could claim the 
government was going to dictate people's 
private sexual activities. Instead we continued 
paying out to university-based researchers and 
demographers to cover the Div i s ion from 
political hea t . " 7 2 Lalonde approved the 
m i n i m u m possible incremental response at the 
federal level, continuing the effort to force the 
onus for major policy changes on to the prov-
inces. 
After arranging for a federal-provincial con-
ference of health ministers for June 1977, L a -
londe revealed the federal position on M a r c h 
4th. The F P D would abandon its "response to 
request" stance and actively promote the idea 
of family planning. It would send family plan-
ning inserts with Fami ly Allowance cheques, 
begin a media campaign and prepare a guide 
on sex education for public schools. The 
federal change in style, however, would have 
to be matched by major provincial changes of 
substance. Provincia l governments were asked 
to review age of consent laws for contraceptive 
counselling, and discuss the "feasibility of 
establishing women's clinics affiliated with 
hospitals to provide family planning, fertility 
counselling, cancer screening, abortions, gener-
al maternal health, breast self-examination in-
struction and related community services in -
cluding counselling i n parenting and family 
l i f e . " 7 3 T h e federal carrot was that these ser-
vices would be included as shareable costs with 
the provinces in the newly proposed Social Ser-
vices Ac t . 
Th is interventionist position died the mo-
ment it was announced. Abor t ion had never 
been mentioned dur ing ini t ial conference prep-
arations. M o r e importantly, no advance 
warning and persuasion had been given to the 
press to help ensure that the proposal would be 
reported sympathetically. " T h e statement 
should have emphasized women's primary 
health services," according to one frustrated 
official. "Instead, the press picked up the 
story, led with the abortion aspect and ignored 
everything e l s e . " 7 4 Th i s is scarcely surprising 
since the Min i s t e r used the term "abor t ion" 
no less than five times in his announcement. 
W h e n the state makes such a move, the in -
tention may be to either simply test the 
political climate, or to intervene and change 
the mixture of opin ion , position and activism 
that makes up that climate. 
In this case, the anti-abortionist forces were 
thoroughly mobil ized; provincial reaction was 
thoroughly negative as well , for the statement 
smacked o f federal duplici ty: "I t looked like 
the Feds were up to the old game of putting 
responsibility on the provinces. H e [Lalonde] 
made it sound like the government was about 
to set up street clinics where 14 year olds could 
get abortions on demand. W e [the F P D ] 
received over a half mi l l ion pieces of mai l over 
that speech, most of it nega t ive ." 7 5 The federal 
deputy minister of Heal th and Welfare ordered 
the Fami ly Planning Divis ion to not i m -
plement the proposal but to maintain its usual 
information-on-request p o l i c y . 7 6 F rom M a r c h 
of 1977 until its final dismantlement i n 1978, 
the F P D was to find itself under almost con-
tinuous political attack by anti-abortionists, 
which made the Divis ion a target for political 
strategists in other sectors of the government. 
Sensing the direction of political response, 
the provincial governments backed away from 
Lalonde's proposals to increase the number of 
approved hospitals, create more abortion com-
mittees, provide contraceptive information 
and establish women's clinics. According to a 
participant, family planning had no priority at 
the 1977 federal-provincial conference of 
health ministers: " O n l y Ontario, Alber ta and 
Quebec had made a public commitment to 
family planning prevention services. They in 
particular feared the backlash generated by 
Lalonde would spill over on to them. The 
provinces wanted to let current procedures 
continue. It was much too dangerous to try 
and effect changes n o w . " 7 7 The provincial 
ministers merely agreed to review the findings 
of the Badgley Report vis-a-vis their own 
provinces. Federal officials considered that 
agreement essential in order to convince the 
provinces to act on the other measures. 
By late summer of 1977, there were wide-
spread rumours of an imminent federal elec-
tion, and Mon ique Begin replaced Lalonde as 
Minis te r o f Nat ional Health and Welfare. 
Begin was regarded within the Liberal Party as 
strong on women's issues, but weak in admin-
istrative skills. H e r feminist image symbolical-
ly reassured pro-reform activists as the govern-
ment withdrew the proposed Social Services 
Ac t and proceeded to dismantle the Family 
Planning Div is ion . Constant attacks by anti-
abortion groups kept her in the political 
spotlight at a time when election rumours filled 
the air and the government's popularity was 
particularly low. In October the Ottawa Journal 
reported that she was considering a depart-
mental review of federal legislation including 
abortion, and that rekindled the political fire 
storm. " T h e whole mess erupted all over again 
just when we were recovering from the L a -
londe fiasco. Anti-choice groups dredged up 
her o ld speeches from before she was Minis ter 
and branded her with them as representing 
current policy. She became paranoid over 
abortion and just w i t h d r e w . " 7 8 Departmental 
officials ordered officials in the F P D to em-
phasize provincial responsibility in family 
planning and wait until after the election 
before developing new p o l i c y . 7 9 
In June of 1978, the F P D hosted a meeting 
with provincial health bureaucrats to discuss 
the provincial reviews of the Badgley Report 
and to share information on provincial preven-
tive programmes. Considerable manoeuvring 
occurred to circumvent the Cabinet 's prohibi-
tion on discussing abortion or the Badgley 
Report. A l l participants agreed beforehand 
that no decisions or recommendations would 
be made, nor advice offered. The meeting was 
billed as a " seminar" and funded out of the 
F P D ' s budget in order to circumvent financial 
review by Treasury Board, which would have 
prevented the meet ing . 8 0 
O n l y Saskatchewan and Ontar io completed 
provincial reviews of the Badgley Report. The 
other provinces shelved their reviews in light of 
the political controversy and denied an agree-
ment had been reached. They acknowledged 
the case made by the Badgley Committee for 
prevention, but emphasized the political dif-
ficulty of implementing the k ind of corrective 
policy implied in the Report: "There was a 
great fear of a political uproar that would 
follow any attempt to expand preventive 
programmes, and the absolute impossibility of 
revising the abortion law. They all agreed it 
was not timely to act and generally wished the 
issue would simply go a w a y . " 8 1 
The Family Planning Division is Aborted 
The seminar was the last major initiative un-
dertaken by the F P D . The division could no 
longer effectively contain the political conflict 
in light of the cumulative effects of the Badgley 
Committee, Morgentaler , Lalonde and Begin. 
Moreover , political strategists realized that 
general economic issues were displacing social 
questions as the most serious threat to the gov-
ernment's fragile popularity. Social policies 
were subordinated to the priority of economic 
restraint. Levels of government spending 
became prime targets of the Parliamentary 
Opposit ion. Against a backdrop of rising in-
flation, taxes and uncontrolled government 
spending, "women's issues" no longer cap-
tured the public 's or the media's attention in 
the late 1970s. " W e knew in the fall of 7 8 , " 
according to a Liberal political advisor, "that 
the state of the economy was a far more 
dangerous area and that social programmes 
were relatively expendable ." 8 2 In the birth 
control /abort ion issue, the government 
switched from a strategy of containment to one 
of abandonment by dismantling the F P D and 
curtailing the activities of its subsidized in-
terest groups, all under the guise of economic 
restraint. The Pr ime Minis ter ' s Office em-
barked on dramatic, highly publicized spend-
ing cuts in current social programmes to make 
the public " f e e l " the restraint personally. Re -
ductions were aimed at controversial pro-
grammes like unemployment insurance or at 
policies where active pressure groups would be 
affected, like the Fami ly Planning Div i s ion . 
Reduced spending in these and other areas 
dramatized the federal government's commit-
ment to economic restraint while conveniently 
reducing programmes which generated 
political controversy. The F P D had the 
smallest constituency in terms of voter 
strength, yet aroused intense political protest 
because of the nature of its activities. F r o m a 
political standpoint, the F P D was now vulner-
able and unnecessary. 
W h e n it withdrew the proposed Social Ser-
vices A c t i n the fall of 1977, the federal govern-
ment had already served notice to the prov-
inces that fertility policy was no longer a 
priori ty, including family planning services, as 
a shareable cost. In August of 1978, the gov-
ernment cut $1 mi l l ion from the F P D ' s Fami ly 
Planning Grants Programme. That Divis ion ' s 
grant budget was the smallest of any i n the 
Department of Nat ional Heal th and Welfare, 
yet it sustained the largest single reduc-
tion—about 50%. The Pr ime Minis ter ' s Of-
fice dictated about $700,000 of the cut direc-
t l y . 8 3 Concurrently, the Department notified 
the Planned Parenthood Federation of 
Canada, which knew that its financial support 
would be gradually reduced, that its sustaining 
grant had been slashed. A senior P P F C staff 
member related: "It happened so quickly. W e 
were blocked out completely; no more con-
sultation, no more access ." 8 4 Reducing the 
Fami ly P lanning Divis ion ' s programmes was a 
purely political act: " T h e i r purpose was to 
send a message to activists in the health and 
welfare area, particularly the anti-choice 
people, that the government knew that 
Catholics were Liberals too. T o the other side, 
the government was giving notice that it was 
backing off on the issue of family planning, 
p e r i o d . " 8 5 
Fol lowing the budget cut, the federal gov-
ernment dismantled the F P D . W i t h the budget 
cuts, reorganization and the freeze on h i r ing , 
the F P D virtually ceased to exist. F r o m its i n -
ception in 1972 unti l September of 1978, the 
Director of the Div i s ion reported to the 
Assistant Deputy Minis ter for Social Services 
on the welfare side of the Department. The 
grants officer, along with the remains of his 
budget and the nurse consultant, were placed 
under the Director-General for Health Ser-
vices. The -community education consultant 
and the resource centre clerks reported to the 
Director-General for Health Promotion. Both 
operated within the Heal th Services and Pro-
motion Branch, which operated primari ly in a 
consultant capacity to the provinces. Former 
F P D personnel were defined as having 20 % of 
their duties devoted to family planning mat-
ters. As of J u l y 1979, there was only one per-
son i n the whole Department working full time 
on family planning projects—a public health 
nurse processing requests for in format ion . 8 6 
Following the F P D ' s demise, plans were 
made in Ocotober of 1978 for a free vote in the 
House of Commons on abortion and capital 
punishment. The cannabis issue was scheduled 
for January of 1979, but that idea was 
dropped. The free-vote mechanism would have 
allowed the Libera l government to abandon 
the issue altogether. Health and Welfare 
Department officials saw every chance that all 
efforts in the area of fertility policy could be 
stopped. In the words of one official, a free vote 
would have "mobi l ized the huns" to reinstate 
the old abortion ban. A general revolt against 
the idea of a free vote i n Parliament developed 
rapidly among the P P F C , certain other 
National Health and Welfare Department of-
ficials, the New Democratic Party's Women 's 
Commission, the Libera l Party's Women 's 
and Youth Commiss ion , and a few Members 
of Parliament from both sides o f the House. 
The government retreated. 
Conclusion 
In the 1960s, feminism became a mass 
movement and an important element in the 
wave of agitation which challenged and sought 
to reform a traditional fertility/abortion system 
serving the middle class but not the poor. 
Public attacks on the informal system of abor-
tion and contraception control led the medical 
profession to ask the state for relief which 
preserved their monopoly. This aid took the 
form of the 1969 abortion reform law. It soon 
became evident that the law operated 
inequitably and public attitudes continued to 
polarize on the abortion/fertility issue. The 
state then moved through virtually its entire 
repertoire of symbolic responses in pursuit of 
an effective strategy to contain the issue; a 
strategy that would preserve the elite-permis-
sive system without damaging the govern-
ment's popularity. 
The federal Cabinet created the Family 
Planning Divis ion as a lightning rod to chan-
nel political controversy into a bureaucratic 
agency which spread a message of concern 
while doing little. The political l ightning 
passed through the F P D , thus insulating the 
government from an issue that might otherwise 
split the Liberal Party's Parliamentary caucus, 
Cabinet, or threaten the government's elec-
toral popularity. 
Al though it became the arena of conflict at 
the federal level, the F P D had almost no sub-
stantive functions. It provided contraceptive 
information to an elite constituency, but not ef-
fectively. It helped maintain the dominant 
view of abortion as an unacceptable form of 
birth control, and propagated the myth that 
abortion and birth control were two different 
things. The F P D did keep lines of com-
munication open; it listened sympathetically to 
reformers, encouraged their good works and, 
when necessary, explained why nothing could 
be done. It also monitored the anti-abortion 
activists by directing their protests onto itself. 
Thus everyone concerned could either talk to 
the Fami ly Planing Divis ion or yell at it. But it 
actually did very little. The F P D is an excellent 
case of what may be termed a symbolic agency. 
It told anti-reformers that abortion was still 
illegal and had no place in the state's concept 
of family planning. It redirected the protests of 
both sides with the argument that effective 
authority, and therefore responsibility, for 
health lay with the doctors and provincial 
governments. The Divis ion spoke to all sides of 
the issue while avoiding substantive action on 
its own. By funding the Planned Parenthood 
Federation of Canada and Serena, the state en-
couraged the growth of a conservative and 
cautious reform movement, and created a 
seemingly autonomous response to its init ia-
tives—a response to which the government 
could in turn appear to respond but which it 
actually controlled. 
The political issues raised by D r . Morgen-
taler, however, redirected the controversy 
squarely back to the federal government v i a its 
Justice Department. In turn, the Justice De-
partment responded with the creation of the 
Badgley Commiss ion on the Operat ion of the 
Abor t ion Law. Its Report gave the rhetoric 
and the facts to the reformers but absolved and 
preserved the policy for elites. T h e Report 
neatly shifted responsibility and thus the blame 
on to the provincial governments and the med-
ical profession. 
F rom the m i d 1960s to the late 1970s, the 
state succeeded in containing the volatile abor-
tion issue, as well as avoiding any substantive 
fertily policy, until reformist energies simply 
ran out of steam or were suffused into the 
political and economic conservatism of the late 
1970s. Then the federal government aban-
doned the issue, judging it safe to " throw it in -
to the streets". The issue has come full circle. 
The controversy remains. The hard core of ac-
tivist reformers is still as committed as ever, 
but without a large public following their ef-
forts have shifted to the very local level. Today 
the conflict centres on individual hospitals 
where pro- and anti-reformers battle each 
other for control of hospital boards, a matter 
safely outside the area of federal jur isdict ion. 
Enough middle- and upper-class women 
with the fortitude and money qualify for abor-
tions under the 1969 law to keep pro-abortion 
groups weak and disorganized. A t the same 
time, anti-abortion activists are mollified by 
the federal government's withdrawal from the 
area of contraception and because abortions 
remain illegal except under restricted circum-
stances. The Canadian Medica l Association 
retains control over abortion delivery, while 
individual medical practitioners continue to 
diffuse responsibility on to abortion com-
mittees and hospitals. F ina l ly , the federal and 
provincial governments can each serve up the 
other as the whipping boy should some 
pressure group demand action. Working-class 
women and those isolated i n rural areas are left 
to fend for themselves and to do what they have 
always done. 
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